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To what extent is there a general factor of risk preference, R, akin to g, the general factor of intelligence? Can
risk preference be regarded as a stable psychological trait? These conceptual issues persist because few attempts
have been made to integrate multiple risk-taking measures, particularly measures from different and largely un-
related measurement traditions (self-reported propensity measures assessing stated preferences, incentivized be-
havioral measures eliciting revealed preferences, and frequency measures assessing actual risky activities).
Adopting a comprehensive psychometric approach (1507 healthy adults completing 39 risk-taking measures, with
a subsample of 109 participants completing a retest session after 6 months), we provide a substantive empirical
foundation to address these issues, finding that correlations between propensity and behavioral measures were
weak. Yet, a general factor of risk preference, R, emerged from stated preferences and generalized to specific
and actual real-world risky activities (for example, smoking). Moreover, R proved to be highly reliable across time,
indicative of a stable psychological trait. Our findings offer a first step toward a general mapping of the construct
risk preference, which encompasses both general and domain-specific components, and have implications for the
assessment of risk preference in the laboratory and in the wild.ade
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 INTRODUCTION
The term “risk” refers to properties of the world, yet without a clear
agreement on its definition, which has ranged from probability, chance,
outcome variance, expected values, undesirable events, danger, losses, to
uncertainties (1, 2). People’s responses to those properties, on the other
hand, are typically described as their “risk preference.” For the behav-
ioral sciences, particularly psychology and economics, risk preference is
one of the key building blocks of human behavior and hence an impor-
tant aspect to be captured by choice theories. However, there is still con-
siderable disagreement on how to conceptualize risk preference on at
least two accounts. First, there is no conclusive answer as to whether risk
preference represents a unitary construct, a multidimensional construct
that varies across life domains, or even a combination of both (3–7).
Second, there is disagreement concerning whether people’s risk prefer-
ences can be thought of as relatively stable—like other psychological
traits (8) and as in the classic economic view of enduring tastes (9, 10)—
or, alternatively, as varying substantially over time and thus more re-
sembling a state (11, 12).
Paralleling the conceptual disagreement, there is also a lack of con-
sensus regarding how to best measure risk preference (13), with one of
the reasons being that different disciplines have used different defini-
tions of risk: Whereas economists usually define risk as variance of
monetary outcomes, psychologists and clinicians often refer to risk as
behavior with potentially harmful consequences (14). In turn, threema-
jor but largely unrelated measurement traditions have evolved across
recent decades: Proponents of the stated-preference tradition harness
people’s introspective abilities and rely on stated preferences obtained
in response either to relatively abstract questions (“Are you generally a
risk-taking person or do you try to avoid risks?”) or tomore specific but
hypothetical scenarios (for example, “How likely would you be to go
white-water rafting at high water in the spring?”) (11, 15–18). Theseself-reported “propensity measures” are widely used in practice, not
least because they are relatively easy to implement. For example, finan-
cial companies often use propensitymeasures to assess their clients’ risk
preference in accordance with the legal requirements for the sale of fi-
nancial products (19). Proponents of the revealed-preference tradition
(20), in contrast, hold that “talk is cheap” to the extent that stated pre-
ferences can be expressed gratuitously without real consequences and
that only actual behavior elicited with tasks involving monetary incen-
tives reveals true risk preference. Behavioral measures range from ab-
stract tasks such as monetary gambles to more naturalistic, game-like
tasks. They have often been designed to capture specific cognitive pro-
cesses (14, 21), such as the integration of gains and losses or the role of
learning and experience. Finally, the construct risk preference has also
been used in clinical and epidemiological studies. There, the frequency
of actual risky activities is assessed (for example, “Howmany cigarettes
do you smoke per day?”) to examine their long-term effects onmorbid-
ity and mortality (22–24). These frequency measures are typically self-
reported, as in the stated-preference tradition, but they focus on specific
and observable behavior, as in the revealed-preference tradition.
Across various disciplines such as psychology and economics, the
numerous extant risk-taking measures from the different traditions
are often used interchangeably, as if they all capture the sameunderlying
construct (13, 14, 21). However, to date, there have been few integrative
attempts to study the conceptual issues raised above. For example, do
stated preferences (obtained through propensity measures), revealed
preferences (obtained through behavioral measures), and assessments
of the engagement in actual risky activities (obtained through frequency
measures) capture the same underlying general construct or set of con-
structs? Can these general or specific constructs of risk preference be
thought of as stable traits?
The psychometric structure of risk preference
In answering questions about the psychometric structure of risk prefer-
ence, it is helpful to draw an analogywith fields that havemade substan-
tial progress in addressing similar questions. For example, the field of
intelligence has relied on extensive psychometric modeling of large bat-
teries of tasks to assess the convergent validity of different intelligence1 of 13
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 measures (that is, the extent to which measures that are supposed to
capture the same underlying construct correlate with each other). Re-
search on the construct of intelligence suggests that although there are
specific dissociable cognitive faculties, such as verbal and spatial abil-
ities, there is also the persistent finding of a “positive manifold” across
measures, which can be captured by a general factor of intelligence, g
(25). This general factor accounts for about 50% of the variance—
consistent with the observation that those who do well in one cognitive
domain also tend to do well in others (interestingly, despite decades of
research, the exact mechanisms that lead to this positive manifold re-
main disputed) (26). Similar patterns have been documented in the
realm of psychopathology, in which a general factor, p, also accounts
for a large proportion of the observed variance (27). Crucially, mapping
the psychometric structure of intelligence and identifying its general
factorhavebeen instrumental inmaking significantprogress inunderstand-
ing its neural (28) and genetic bases (29), suggesting that this could be an
important path for the understanding of the construct risk preference
and respective theories as well.
To date, it is unknownwhether a positivemanifold also exists across
the extant risk-taking measures and, consequently, to what extent there
is a general factor of risk preference, R, that captures commonalities be-
tweenmeasures or domains. The possible existence of a general factor of
risk preference operating across different measures and life domains,
such as health, wealth, or recreation, would inform our theoretical con-
ception of the psychological construct: Is it akin to a domain-general,
unitary trait, or instead, is it more appropriate to assume multiple psy-
chological constructs that need to be invoked to account for inter-
individual differences in risk preference across domains? In the
extreme, observing no common variance in risk preference across mea-
sures and life domains would call into question the idea of risk prefer-
ence as a unitary psychological trait and challenge the way classic
economic theorizing has conceived of risk preference. In contrast,
extracting a general factor across the diversemeasures of risk preference
would imply that such a general factor captures systematic common
variance, over and above the improvements in reliability that are to
be expected when aggregating measures that were designed to capture
the same construct (because various risk-taking measures were pur-
posely designed to capture domain-specific risk preference, for example,
recreational risk taking and health risk taking).
For several reasons, past empirical evidence does not permit a con-
clusive answer regarding the general versus domain-specific nature of
risk preference. First, the vast majority of past empirical work on risk
preference has typically used single measures or not explicitly explored
the convergent validity ofmultiplemeasures. For example, ameta-analysis
of age differences in risk preference found that only 2 in 29 studies re-
ported multiple measures of risk preference (with one study report-
ing twomeasures and another study reporting three measures of risk
preference) (30).
Second, the few studies that have systematically estimated the em-
pirical convergence between different measures have produced mixed
results: Although some studies show significant associations between
propensity measures as well as links between the latter and behavioral
measures (11, 16, 31), others suggest poor convergence between mea-
sures from the same (behavioral) tradition (32–34). One should note
that the significant effects reported in these studies are typically small.
In addition, these studies were often quite restricted in the number of
implementedmeasures, thus often not encompassing measures that re-
present different measurement traditions, such as stated and revealed
preferences.Frey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017Third, and finally, unlike in the fields of intelligence or psycho-
pathology, past studies on the construct of risk preference have typically
not adopted state-of-the-art techniques of psychometricmodeling, with
only few exceptions that either implemented relatively few measures
(35) or used psychometric modeling only within one specific question-
naire (36). However, these techniques are indispensable for a clear
decomposition of the measures’ variance into shared and unique com-
ponents that indicate how risk preference should be conceptualized: as a
unitary construct, a collection of independent factors, or a combination
of both.
In sum, the existing evidence cannot conclusively answer the key
question of the extent to which risk preference should be thought of as
a general construct that explains variance across different types of mea-
sures and life domains. To address this issue, we apply psychometric
tools as have previously been implemented, for instance, in research on
intelligence.
The temporal stability of risk preference
The issue of temporal stability is paramount to a conceptualization of
constructs as either traits or states. The definition of a psychological trait
hinges largely on consistency across time (37, 38). This definition does
not exclude the possibility that a trait can show sizable variation as a
function of specific life stages or momentary shocks, but it assumes
some basic degree of rank-order stability (11). Accordingly, an interac-
tional view regards states as a person’s adaptation to particular situa-
tions, whereas traits are assumed to remain stable across time and
situations (37, 38). Consequently, a state is typically defined as a rela-
tively rapid and reversible variation aroundaperson’smean-level behavior
or preferences, which may be associated with either the exogenous
environment (situational factors) or the endogenous environment (for ex-
ample, cognitive or emotional processes occurring within a person) (38).
Finally, “trait change” refers to mean-level changes across time, which, as
outlined above, does not preclude the possibility of substantial rank-order
stability across persons.
To date, relatively little is known about the temporal stability of risk
preference, particularly in terms of a potential general factor, making
strong conclusions about whether risk preference may include a trait
component impossible (39). However, recent work suggests considera-
ble stability for stated preferences even across periods of years (11), and
repeated assessments of stated risk preferences have rendered it possible
to extract a reliable signal, which proved to have increased predictive
validity for risk-taking behaviors as opposed to the single momentary
assessments (40). In contrast, less is known about the stability of risk
preference when assessed with behavioral measures, particularly invol-
ving longer delays (39). To uncover the potential trait- or state-like na-
ture of the construct of risk preference, it is therefore essential to assess
the temporal stability of stated and revealed preferences, and, in partic-
ular, of the psychometric factors extracted from them. Under the as-
sumption that these psychometric factors capture somewhat stable
constructs, they can be expected to reflect more error-free (and thus
more reliable) indicators of a person’s risk preference.
Overview and aims of the present study
Our study was designed to close these gaps empirically by adopting a
comprehensive psychometric framework based on a large battery of
risk-taking measures that were sampled from the different measure-
ment traditions. In so doing, we sought to examine (i) the convergent
validity of different risk-taking measures and measurement traditions,
(ii) the extent to which a general factor of risk preference exists across2 of 13
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as measured by single measures and the psychometric factors extracted
from them (in a subsample of participants). That is, the study’s goal was
to clarify the degree to which risk preference should be conceptualized
as a general construct, as separate distinct components, or as a combi-
nation of both, as well as to examine the temporal stability of these
constructs.
Mapping the psychometric structure and stability of risk preference
will be a crucial step toward uncovering its potential biological under-
pinnings (10, 41, 42) and its real-world consequences (43, 44). Relatedly,
a comprehensive examination of the construct’s psychometric structure
may permit classifying it within the space of other psychological
constructs and clarify to what extent interindividual differences in risk
preference correspondwith interindividual differences in potentially re-
lated variables. For example, socioeconomic factors such as income or
education (16, 45–47), cognitive and numerical abilities (48, 49), and
personality characteristics such as the Big Five personality traits (11, 50)
have all been suggested to overlap or even drive risk preference. We will
thus explore how predictive these variables are for the different measures
and particularly for the psychometric factors extracted from them. o
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 RESULTS
A daylong session in one of the two study centers, Basel (Switzerland)
or Berlin (Germany), was completed by 1507 healthy adults (aged 20 to
36 years; table S1). This comprised a series of five questionnaires asses-
sing stated preferences (22 propensity measures including all subscales),
eight behavioral tasks assessing revealed preferences (seven of which
were incentivized with monetary amounts as typically used in the liter-
ature; in total, there were nine behavioral measures including all depen-
dent variables), and six scales assessing current and past risky activities,
such as smoking, substance use, and gambling (eight frequency mea-
sures including all subscales; see Table 1). These 39 measures represent
a broad sample of popular measures in research on risk preference (14, 21).
Detailed information about the design and protocol of the study is
provided in Materials and Methods and in the Supplementary Materials.
Convergent validity
Figure 1 depicts a network plot of the partial correlations between all
measures (only correlations exceeding an absolute value of 0.1; the full
correlation matrix is provided in table S2), after controlling for age, sex,
and study center. We controlled for age and sex to examine the con-
vergent validity of different measures beyond the influence of these two
key variables underlying risk preference (that is, a tendency for a reduction
in risk preference across the life span, starting in the early adulthood, aswell
as a stronger preference for risk inmales) (11, 18, 30, 51–53). The network
was generated using a force-directed algorithm such that correlated nodes
(that is, risk-takingmeasures) attracted each other and uncorrelated nodes
repulsed each other (54). Overall, there was a substantial gap between the
stated- andrevealed-preferencemeasurement traditions,with thebehavior-
al measures correlating only weakly with the propensity measures (M =
0.06,HDI= 0.05 to 0.06).Moreover, the correlations among the behavioral
measures were substantially weaker (M = 0.08, HDI = 0.06 to 0.10) than
those among the propensity measures (M = 0.20, HDI = 0.18 to 0.21;
DM = 0.12, DHDI = 0.09 to 0.14, d = 1.22) or the frequency measures
(M = 0.18, HDI = 0.14 to 0.23; DM = 0.10, DHDI = 0.05 to 0.15, d =
1.15). The frequency measures’ correlations with the propensity
measures were substantially stronger (M = 0.13, HDI = 0.12 to
0.15) than those with the behavioral measures (M = 0.03, HDI = 0.03 toFrey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 20170.04). This pattern suggests that different propensity measures capture re-
lated components of the construct risk preference (which seem to be re-
lated to those captured by frequencymeasures), whereas each behavioral
measure captures unique variance that is unrelated to that of the pro-
pensity measures, frequency measures, or even other behavioral
measures.
These results were corroborated by rank-order analyses that relax
the assumption of linear relations between measures (Fig. 1, panels
on the right). Specifically, for eachmeasure, we assigned a rank to every
person (rank 1 for the most risk-taking person and rank 1507 for the
least risk-taking person) and then determined each person’s mean rank
across measures, separately for the three measurement traditions. Pro-
vided that there is sufficient resolution within and perfect consistency
across measures, the resulting mean ranks would be uniformly dis-
persed between 1 and 1507 (that is, forming a diagonal line in the panels
on the right of Fig. 1). Because most measures do not provide a reso-
lution for 1507 distinct values, we simulated perfectly consistent and
random ranks across measures to obtain two extreme benchmarks
for consistency. We then determined how much larger the SDs of
the empirical ranks were, relative to those of the respective random
ranks (a wide dispersion of ranks implies higher consistency across
measures). Compared with their respective random rank orders, the
empirical rank orders had a wider dispersion of 115.6 ranks (propensity
measures; HDI = 107.1 to 124.0), 31.8 ranks (behavioral measures; HDI =
23.2 to 40.7), and 61.7 ranks (frequency measures; HDI = 52.2 to 71.4).
That is, and as Fig. 1 shows (see the panels on the right), the empirical
rank order resulting from the propensity measures fell in between per-
fectly consistent and random ranking, suggesting that the different pro-
pensity measures produced a somewhat but not perfectly consistent
pattern. In contrast, the empirical rank order of the behavioralmeasures
was almost identical to that expected from random ranking. The
consistency of the frequency measures was somewhat higher but did
not come close to that of the propensity measures.
Psychometric modeling
To investigate the extent to which the relation between measures could
stem from a general risk-preference factor, R, while accommodating
specific factors that stem from shared variance between specific mea-
sures and domains, we implemented a psychometric bifactor model
(36, 55, 56). In contrast to a hierarchical model, in which the general
(higher-order) factor merely summarizes shared variance across first-
order factors, the general factor in a bifactor model directly accounts
for shared variance at the level ofmeasures, leaving the residual variance
to be captured by specific, orthogonal factors. Hence, it is a more direct
test for the existence of a general factor. Figure 2 shows the results of this
analysis, namely, the general factorR and the specific factors F1 to F7, as
well as the proportion of variance in each of themeasures accounted for
by these factors [depicted as colored stacked bars; factor loadings of the
preceding exploratory factor analysis (EFA) are provided in table S4]. R
accounted for a substantial portion of variance in several propensity
measures and frequency measures but for little to no variance in the
behavioral measures. Of the explained variance (31%), R accounted
for 61%, and all the specific factors together accounted for 39%. Con-
firmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that the model fit was satis-
factory [standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.05; root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.04; df = 632; com-
parative fit index (CFI) = 0.94; Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = 0.93]. How-
ever, overall, a substantial proportion of variance (in particular in the
behavioral measures) could not be accounted for. To compare, in fields3 of 13
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L ETable 1. Risk-taking measures used in the Basel-Berlin Risk Study. DV, dependent variable. All measures were coded such that higher values indicate more
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 with stronger test-theoretic backgrounds, similar bifactor models
accounted for substantially higher proportions of explained variance, rang-
ing from 50% in intelligence (55) up to 62% in psychopathology (56).
When we implemented a bifactor model with an inclusion criterion that
was twice as strict (see Materials and Methods), resulting in a winnowed-
down set of 13 of the 39 measures (fig. S3), the model (RMSEA = 0.06;
SRMR = 0.05; df = 52; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.95) accounted for 53% of the
variance, withR still accounting for 50%of the explained variance. Crucial-
ly, this latter solution excluded all behavioral measures.
In sum, a general factor of risk preference,R, could be extracted. This
factor explained substantial variance across propensity measures and
frequency measures of risky activities but did not generalize to behav-
ioral measures. Moreover, there was only one specific factor that cap-
tured common variance across behavioralmeasures, specifically, choices
among different types of risky lotteries (F7). Beyond the variance
accounted for by R, the remaining six factors captured specific variance
associated with health risk taking (F1), financial risk taking (F2), recrea-
tional risk taking (F3), impulsivity (F4), traffic risk taking (F5), and risk
taking at work (F6).
Temporal stability
To assess whether any of the risk-taking measures or extracted
factors exhibit some basic degree of stability, we assessed test–retest
correlations in a subsample of 109 participants, who completed the
battery of measures twice, at a 6-month interval (see Materials and
Methods). Factor values were computed on the basis of the model
identified in the main sample; that is, no new model was estimated
in the smaller retest subsample. As Fig. 3 shows, the test–retest cor-
relations of the propensity measures (M = 0.68, HDI = 0.64 to 0.72)
and the frequency measures (M = 0.65, HDI = 0.52 to 0.77) tended to
be higher than those of the behavioral measures (M = 0.46, HDI = 0.29
to 0.63; DM = 0.22, DHDI = 0.04 to 0.39, d = 1.3; DM = 0.19, DHDI =
−0.02 to 0.40, d = 0.92). Notably, the general risk-preference factor R,
which summarized the largest commonality across all measures, had
the second highest test–retest reliability of all factors and measures at 0.85.
Examining test–retest reliability in isolation may be misleading
because some measures could have obtained such a reliability at the
expense of not capturing any interindividual differences (that is, for a
“trivial”measure to which all participants respond identically, it would
not be surprising to observe high test–retest reliability). Therefore, we
also report each measure’s coefficient of variation as an indicator of
standardized variance captured across participants. As Fig. 3 shows,
the propensity measures (M = 0.32, HDI = 0.23 to 0.41) and behavioral
measures (M = 0.30, HDI = 0.16 to 0.45) captured similar amounts of
interindividual differences, albeit less than the frequency measures didFrey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017(M = 0.84, HDI = 0.45 to 1.21). That is, propensity measures did not
achieve high test–retest reliability as a result of being trivial stimuli to
which most participants provide the same (or similar) responses.
The reliability analyses illustrated that some of the measures are far
from yielding error-free responses. Measurement error in the different
measures may stem from changes in observable factors over time, as
well as from random changes that cannot be attributed to external
factors (40). The decomposition of error into these two sources has
rarely been made, and with little success in attributing error to system-
atic changes in external variables (for example, changes in sociodemo-
graphic variables did not account for measurement error in time
preference) (57). However, irrespective of its source,measurement error
may provide an explanation for the partially low correlations between
measures. Specifically, the reliabilities of any two measures impose an
upper limit for the correlation that can be expected between them. Be-
cause reliabilities are almost never perfect, most empirical correlations
are thus “attenuated” (58). To control for measurement error, we dis-
attenuated each correlation by dividing the empirical correlation by the
geometric mean of the two measures’ reliabilities and replotted Fig. 1.
As to be expected, correlations betweenmeasures substantially increased
(fig. S2 and table S3). However, the overall pattern with a clear gap be-
tweenbehavioralmeasures andpropensity aswell as frequencymeasures
persisted. Because of the low reliabilities of some behavioral measures,
disattenuating the correlations led to some very strong inflations. Thus,
we did not extract latent variables from the latter, in line with previous
recommendations to only disattenuate correlations between measures
with reliabilities of at least 0.7 (59).
Relation of risk preference with sociodemographic,
cognitive, and personality characteristics
It is beyond the scope of this article to systematically examine the var-
ious potential drivers underlying interindividual differences in risk pref-
erence. Yet, at least three categories of variables have previously been
considered as such driving forces and are thus predestined to be tested
for their associations with the extracted psychometric factors: socio-
economiccircumstances, suchas aperson’sprevious economicexperiences,
current economic situation (that is, socioeconomic status), or educa-
tional level (16, 45–47); cognitive and numerical abilities, to the extent
that the evaluation of risky options requires some degree of arithmetical
skills (48, 49); and personality characteristics, such as the Big Five per-
sonality traits (11, 50).
Consequently, we ran a series of Bayesian regression analyses (see
Materials andMethods) to examine whether any of these variables pre-
dict interindividual differences inR and the other, specific factors of risk
preference. Personalitymeasureswere available for 297 of the participants,Measure Subscale/DV AbbreviationFagerström test for nicotine dependence (23) Total score FTNDPathological gambling (24) Total score PGDrug Abuse Screening Test (101) Total score DASTEncounters with risky situations (102) Aggressive behavior CAREaSexual behavior CAREsBehavior at work CAREwRisky behaviors in the past month (4) Total score Dm5 of 13
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 froman assessment in the context of a previous and independent study,
which was conducted about 2 years earlier (with a mean time lag of
25.9months per person). The regression analyses (table S6) revealed that
risk preference, asmeasured byR and the specific factors, wasmost closely
related to various personality measures—even though these measures
were collected substantially earlier. Specifically, “openness to experience”
and “extraversion” were positively associated with general risk prefer-
ence (R), whereas “conscientiousness” and “agreeableness” were nega-
tively associated with R. Similar patterns emerged for the specific factors.
In contrast, sociodemographic variables and cognitive abilities were not
systematically associatedwith the factors, the only exceptions being “socio-
economic status,”whichweakly predicted increased risk taking atwork (F6),
and “numeracy,” which weakly predicted increased risk taking in the risky
lotteries (F7). In sum, these analyses suggest that risk preference exhibits
properties that are more closely related to (other) personality traits, as com-
pared to a person’s socioeconomic circumstances or cognitive abilities.DISCUSSION
Our study evaluated the convergent validity and test–retest reliability of
a range of risk-takingmeasures across differentmeasurement traditions
(39 risk-takingmeasures collected from 1507 participants). On this em-
pirical basis, let us revisit the questions pertaining to the nature of the
construct risk preference. Our findings, obtained from state-of-the-artFrey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017psychometric modeling analyses, can be summarized as follows: First,
we found a substantial gap between stated and revealed preferences.
This gapwas observed at the level of simple correlations and rank orders,
as well as in terms of the general psychometric factor R that captured
shared variance across propensity measures and frequency measures but
not across behavioral measures. Second, propensity measures showed
substantially higher test–retest reliability across 6 months than behavioral
measures, and the general factor R proved to be even more reliable across
time—providing support for the idea of risk preference as a psychological
constructwith a certaindegreeof temporal stability.What does this suggest
about the nature of risk preference?
The nature of risk preference
At the outset, we reviewed the lack of consensus about how to concep-
tualize risk preference—a construct that is often regarded as a key build-
ing block of human behavior in both psychology and economics. Our
results inform and enrich this discussion in several respects.
First, the present work helps to overcome the overly simplistic view
of risk preference as either general or domain-specific. Current theories
of intelligence and psychopathology suggest that there are both general
and domain- or facet-specific components to each construct (26, 27).
Akin to this theory development, our results suggest that such a view
may also be most suitable to understand the nature of risk preference.
Specifically, a general factor of risk preference accounted for about halfBART
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Fig. 1. Network plot showing the correlations between risk-taking measures (only correlations exceeding an absolute value of 0.1; n = 1507). The full names
of the measures are provided in Table 1. The panels on the right show the empirical rank orders across the measures of each tradition (participants sorted by their mean
rank plotted against their actual mean rank). Each panel also displays two benchmarks resulting from simulated ranking: The blue curves depict the rank order
assuming perfect consistency across measures (these ranks do not form entirely straight lines because some of the measures comprise a finite number of possible
response values, thus leading to tied ranks). The brown curves depict the rank order assuming no consistency across measures (that is, random ranks).6 of 13
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 of the explained variance, and a series of specific factors accounted for
approximately the other half. That is, after accounting for general risk
preference, some specific domains (for example, investment or recrea-
tion) persist, because these may differ psychologically in terms of the
risks and benefits that respondents perceive (4). This finding converges
with observations that have recently been made within a single ques-
tionnaire of risk preference (36). In our findings, several of the specific
factors capture variance from diverse measures (that is, scales),
providing insight into some of the underlying mechanisms: For exam-
ple, F3 captured recreational risk taking, and the factor structure sug-
gests that this tendency may be triggered by a desire for “thrill and
adventure seeking.” In contrast, F1 captured alcohol consumption
and smoking, and the respective factor structure indicates that these be-
haviors occur because of problems with disinhibitory processes. In line
with these insights, risk taking is considered to be a subdimension of
disinhibition in psychopathology (60). Future studies may thus benefit
from examining these (domain-specific) clusters of risk-taking mea-
sures inmore detail to identify the sources of interindividual differences.
Second, our results speak to the important question of whether risk
preference—in terms of a latent variable that is assessed bymultiple and
diverse measures—can be considered a stable psychological construct.
Our test–retest reliability analyses indicate that Rwas impressively stable
across time, paralleling the findings from intelligence and personality
research that have obtained similar or even higher values across periods
of years or decades (8, 61). Whereas the aggregation of multiple mea-
sures can be expected to reduce unsystematic error, an increase in test–
retest reliability does not automatically follow andmay only be observed
if the captured construct indeed remains stable across time: For exam-
ple, the aggregation of multiple risky lotteries in one factor (F7) did not
lead to a substantial improvement in test–retest reliability. Conversely, the
entity underlying the positive manifold across the various risk-taking
measures, as captured by R, appears to constitute a relatively stable trait.
Futurework that carries this research forward (by including a comprehen-
sive measurement of risk preference in longitudinal designs across longer
periods) will be needed to thus establish the degree of temporal stability
and relative predictive validity of the different types ofmeasures discussedFrey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017here. Moreover, the (domain-)specific psychometric factors, which were
orthogonal to R, turned out to have substantially lower test–retest relia-
bility as compared to R. In line with an integrated trait-state perspective
(38), these specific factors may thus rather reflect particular states, which
complement a general trait (also see the next subsection).
Third and finally, we explored the relationship of different variables
that have previously been suggested to be associated with or even to
drive risk preference. In the investigated range of potential predictor
variables, we found that risk preference, as manifested in the general
factor R, most closely relates to the Big Five personality traits. Two of
these traits (openness to experience and extraversion) were positively
associated with R, and two traits (conscientiousness and agreeableness)
were negatively associated with R. However, these associations were
weak, suggesting that risk preference may reflect a partly related but
independent construct. This interpretation is in line with previous re-
search that has concluded that risk taking is sufficiently independent
from personality factors and thus may constitute a separate construct
(62). Furthermore, we did not find associations between socioeconomic
and cognitive dimensions and the general factor R. It is important to
note that we evaluated potential links between risk preference and co-
variates while controlling for the effects of age and sex that have shown
systematic links to risk preference (11, 30). Consequently, our results
represent associations of individual differences in personality that go
beyond any age or sex effects. In future research, the convergent and
divergent validity of both the general and specific factors of risk prefer-
ence with yet other psychological traits will need to be studied system-
atically, for example, with multitrait-multimethod approaches (63).
The gap between propensity and behavioral measures
Previous work on the convergent validity of various measures of risk
preference has been inconclusive because of its reliance on small sets
of measures and the lack of psychometric approaches that allow dis-
tinguishing between general and domain- ormeasurement-specific var-
iance (32, 33). Our work provides more conclusive evidence in this
regard by suggesting the following main findings that deserve close
consideration: the substantial convergence between the propensityBA
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 measures and their relatively high test–retest reliability, the lack of
convergence between behavioral measures and their relatively low
test–retest reliability, and the gap in convergent validity between
propensity and behavioral measures. That is, unlike in research on
intelligence but akin to the results from personality or psychopathology
research, our results suggest a primacy of self-reports over behav-
ioral measures, which extends both to convergent validity and to
test–retest reliability. These results are of theoretical but also practi-
cal utility because the observed gap between stated and revealed pre-
ferences suggests that measures from the propensity and behavioral
measurement traditions cannot be used interchangeably to capture
risk preference.
When considering the relatively high convergent validity of the
self-reported propensity measures, one needs to discuss the extent
to which this convergence represents a reliable signal or, alternatively,
undesired bias (for example, a distorted self-perception). Past and cur-
rent psychological theories suggest that self-reports contain a “kernel of
truth” that goes beyond bias (64) and that “intentions to performbehav-
iors of different kinds can be predicted with high accuracy from atti-
tudes toward the behavior” (65). These conclusions are supported
both by evidence of convergent validity between self-reports and infor-
mant reports (66) and by the predictive validity of self-reports for real-
world behavior (43, 67). For example, in the neighboring field of research
on impulsivity, a meta-analysis across different impulsivity measures
found substantially higher correlations between different self-reports
and informant reports (~0.5) than between behavioral tasks and in-
formant reports (~0.1) (66). Similarly, self-reported impulsivity and
self-control have been shown to have high predictive validity, andmore
so than behavioral measures, for a number of real-world outcomes,
such as teenage pregnancy, drug use, and financial security (43, 67).
Thus, it is difficult to dismiss the convergence of self-reported pro-
pensity measures simply as bias. Moreover, their convergence and
their high temporal stability may be rooted in the way that they elicitFrey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017preferences based on respondents retrieving episodes of real-world
behaviors from memory. Past psychological research suggests that
people use chronically accessible and stable sources (for example,
prototypical situations from everyday life) to make personality judg-
ments (for example, regarding life satisfaction) (68). Consequently, if
different propensitymeasures tap into similar prototypical situations
and episodes from memory, then they are likely to produce consistent
results that are anchored in people’s actual experiences of risk and
risk taking.
Concerning the low convergent validity of behavioral measures
(and lower test–retest reliability as compared to propensity and frequency
measures), it is important to ask what factors may contribute to this
pattern of results. According to the constructed-preferences approach
(69), people construct preferences online in response to a specific con-
text defined by queries, cues, and internal states (70). Because behavioral
measures differ widely in their choice architectures (in terms of their
presentation format, specific instructions, or framing), they may be de-
signed, perhaps unwittingly, to elicit different queries and cues and thus
trigger diverging constructed preferences (34). Moreover, it has pre-
viously been observed that specific task manipulations can override
traits (71). Behavioral tasks may thus not be suitable instruments for
measuring general risk preference, but they may be indispensable if
one is interested in capturing responses to specific choice architectures,
such as whether risks are presented in a descriptive or experiential
format (72). Equally, they may be useful for examining how different
choice architectures interact with intraindividual (73) or interindividual
differences (74). Hence, the various behavioral measures may capture
states rather than a general and stable trait, in line with an interactional
viewof howbothperson and situation characteristics determine behavior
(37, 38). That is, a potential reason for the high inconsistencies between
the various behavioral measures may be that they capture various cog-
nitive processes (beyond risk preference) andmay give rise to the use
of different strategies. A promising outcome of the current analysis,0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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 however, is that there are a number of behavioral tasks involving de-
scribed risks that capture common variance (F7). Given its relatively
low temporal stability, this factor may capture a particular state, which
is independent from the general trait (R). Futureworkwill need to assess
the extent to which the particular characteristics of these measures
contribute to this convergence. Except for numeracy, which was weakly
associated with F7, overall, our regression analyses did not suggest an
important role for cognitive ability or numeracy in accounting for the
patterns captured by the specific factors (tables S5 and S6). In sum,
future work on the potential driving forces underlying interindividual
differences in (domain-specific) risk preference may thus profit from
an integrated trait-state perspective (38).
An additional potential explanation for the lack of consistency be-
tween different behavioral measures is of a motivational nature: It is
possible that the payoffmagnitudes used in the typical studies are simply
too small to engage participants sufficiently and elicit actual risk prefer-
ence. If this were true, then the results of our study, in which we imple-
mented the typical payment schemes as used in the literature, would
indicate a serious problemwith current state-of-the-art implementation
of behavioral measures. However, the potential effects of incentives in
behavioral tasks can be diverse, and their usefulness remains disputed
(75, 76). Moreover, consistency across measures can be achieved even
in the complete absence of any incentives, as shown in the propensity
measures discussed above.
Limitations
One potential limitation of this study is that we did not specifically
include any extreme groups of risk takers. Future research should thus
investigate the extent to which our findings generalize to more diverse
populations.Moreover, the risk-takingmeasures were administered in a
fixed order, potentially leading to sequence effects and thus inflated cor-
relations between neighboring measures. For example, the relatively
high correlations between propensity measures may have partly re-
sulted from this effect, because the measures were administered within
the same block of the experimental session. However, two arguments
speak against this interpretation: First, such a sequence effect should also
have emerged for the behavioral measures, which were also presented
together, yet we did not find high intercorrelations between these mea-
sures. Moreover, sequence effects, if they occurred, could not explain the
high test–retest reliability of propensity measures that we observed.
Implications for the measurement of risk preference
The present findings have wide-ranging scientific and practical implica-
tions: For example, previous studies examining the genetic and neural
underpinnings of risk preference have used single propensity measures
(10) or single behavioralmeasures (77, 78). However, our results suggest
that future empirical work on risk preferences may profit from using
several measures to reduce measurement error and, in particular, to ex-
tract variance that is shared across diverse measures of risk preference,
beyond the systematic variance that is specific to the individual (domain-
specific) measures. Moreover, our findings would advise against some
commonly used measures on the basis of their low test–retest reliability.
Overall, any improvements in establishing a reliable phenotypic con-
struct of risk preference could foster future studies of its genetic and neu-
ral underpinnings (10, 41, 42) and real-world consequences (43, 44) that
may involve small effect sizes. For example, a reliable assessment of risk
preference could prove useful for designing targeted interventions in do-
mains such as recreation and health, in which accurate personality de-
scriptions may be key to targeting the right persons (79).Frey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017Of course, it will not always be feasible to collect large batteries of
risk-taking measures in practice, such as when pooling multiple studies
in the context of consortia designed to robustly examine the genetic un-
derpinnings of certain phenotypes (80). In these cases, specific shorter
subscales or even individual measures may be used as proxies for R, for
example, thehealth risk-taking subscale of thedomain-specific risk-attitude
scale (that is, “Dhea”) or the general risk-taking item of the German socio-
economic panel (that is, “SOEP”), which correlatedwithR at 0.79 and 0.57,
respectively. In practice, the use of self-reported risk preferencemeasures is
already common in some domains, such as finance (19). According to our
analyses, these propensity measures exhibit desirable psychometric prop-
erties, such as convergent validity and test–retest reliability. However,
one has to bear in mind that these proxy assessments do not capture
the full breadth of risk preference and also cannot take advantage of
the reductions in measurement error and increases in reliability, as pro-
mised by a more comprehensive assessment of the trait-like construct R.CONCLUSION
Our work suggests that risk preference has a psychometric structure
akin to other major psychological traits, such as intelligence. It involves
both a general, stable component that can account for about half of the
explained variance and a series of facets, each capturing more specific
aspects of risk preference. These results contribute to the debate about
the domain-specific nature of risk preference and indicate that this
construct encompasses both general and domain-specific components.
We also identified a marked gap between measures of stated and re-
vealed preferences, suggesting that more consideration needs to be given
to the measurement of risk preference. These results have implications
for both basic and applied research because a solid measurement of risk
preference will be needed to uncover both its biological basis and its
consequences for many momentous decisions in the real world.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental design
Inclusion criteria, sample size, and sociodemographic data
We recruited 1512 healthy participants between 20 and 35 years of age
whodid not have anyneurological (for example, epilepsy) or psychiatric
(for example, depression and schizophrenia) disorders. Of these, we ex-
cluded 5 participants who did not complete four or more of the behav-
ioral tasks or questionnaires, resulting in a total sample size of 1507
participants (746 inBasel and 761 in Berlin). This sample size established
a solid participants-to-item ratio of 39:1 and thus promised to yield reli-
able results from the latent variable modeling (17). Note that we do not
report classic significant tests for the correlations but interpret them di-
rectly as effect sizes, because the relatively large sample size would render
even small correlations significant. The retest subsample (n = 109) was
recruited from the Berlin sample. We also recruited a retest subsample
from the Basel sample, but because this subsample was smaller (n = 64)
and assessed across a shorter interval (3months),we only report theBerlin
retest subsample here (data for the Basel retest subsample are available
upon request). Table S1 shows sociodemographic information.
Approvals of institutional review boards
The respective local ethics committees (Ethikkommission beider Basel,
Ethikkommission desMax-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, Berlin)
approved the study, which was conducted in accordance with the Dec-
laration of Helsinki. Participants received a detailed explanation of the
study, and written informed consent was obtained.9 of 13
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 Compensation
Participants received a fixed payment plus a bonus contingent on their
decisions in the incentivized behavioral tasks.We took into account the
different wage levels at the Swiss andGerman study centers tomake the
monetary incentives comparable: The fixed amount was based on
the typical hourly wage for research assistants at the local universities,
namely, 15 CHF in Basel and 10 EUR in Berlin (it took most parti-
cipants 8 hours to complete the study, resulting in a fixed payment of
120CHFor 80 EUR). In addition, participants collected bonus points in
the incentivized tasks, before each of which they were informed about
the conversion rate of points into CHF or EUR (we used the same scaling
factor of 0.66 between study centers as for the fixed payment). Partici-
pants started with an initial bonus of 15 CHF or 10 EUR (mimicking
the incentives typically used in the literature) and were informed that
in the two most extreme cases, they could either maximally double or
entirely lose this amount, depending on their choices. At the end of the
study, one of the incentivized tasks was randomly selected, and the
respective outcome was either added to or subtracted from the initial
bonus.
Study schedule
The study consisted of a daylong session in one of the two laboratories,
Basel or Berlin. It started at 9:00 a.m. when participants were given
written information about the study (that is, inclusion and exclusion
criteria,monetary compensation, duration, and data protection). Partic-
ipants then provided written informed consent, completed a question-
naire tapping sociodemographic data, and rated their general and
current affective state. At 9:15 a.m., participants started completing
the behavioral tasks, with 10-min breaks at about 10:30 a.m. and
11:20 a.m. Before the second break, participants provided a saliva sam-
ple and again rated their current affective state. After another behavioral
task, participants had a lunch break at around 12 noon. The study recom-
menced at 1:00 p.m. with a test of participants’ working memory capacity
and another rating of their current affective state. After a 10-min break,
participants completed the last two behavioral tasks and another memory
test.After a final 10-minbreak, participants completeda series of self-report
questionnaires. At around 4:00 p.m., participants provided final ratings of
their current affective state and were compensated for their participation.
Throughout the study, a server-side framework ensured that the procedure
at both study centers was identical (for example, the same task order, the
same duration of breaks, etc.) and automatically loaded the different tasks
and questionnaires. Time-sensitive tasks were run offline. Participants
completed the study in private cubicles (a maximum of six participants
were present at any time), and at least one laboratorymanager was perma-
nently available to assist participants if they needed any support. Details
regarding the methods of the implemented tasks can be found in the Sup-
plementary Materials.
Statistical analyses
Data preprocessing and robustness checks
The followingmeasures were heavily skewed: GABS, FTND, PG,DAST,
CAREa, CAREs, and CAREw. We therefore transformed them into or-
dinal bins (we created bins such that at least 50 participants were pre-
sent in each and the number of bins was maximized, to get the best
resolution—in the extreme case, this resulted in a binary classification
of participants, such as smokers versus nonsmokers in the case of the
FTND). The final distributions of all risk-taking measures are shown
in fig. S1.
Past literature suggests that there are important age and sex differ-
ences associated with risk preference (11, 18, 30, 51–53). To ensure thatFrey et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701381 4 October 2017the correlations between risk-taking measures were not inflated by age,
sex, or study center, we first ran linear models with these three variables
as predictors of each of the risk-taking measures (for measures without
a continuous scale, we ran ordinal regressions). For the main analyses,
we used the resulting residuals. Of the 58,773 data points (1507 parti-
cipants × 39measures), 82 weremissing (0.14%). To avoid convergence
issues in the main analyses, particularly in the latent variable modeling,
we imputed these missing data points by means of Gibbs sampling
using the R package mice (81). The imputation of the missing data
points affected the correlations between the different measures only
negligibly, with the absolute values of the correlations changing on
average by 0.0007 and the most affected correlation changing by an
absolute value of 0.016. All reported correlations are based on a het-
erogeneous correlationmatrix obtainedwith the R package polycor (82),
that is, Pearson’s correlations between continuous measures, polyserial
correlations between continuous and ordinal measures, and polychoric
correlations between ordinal measures.
Bayesian inference statistics
The reported inference statistics for convergent validity (that is, corre-
lational analyses and rank analyses) and temporal stability (test–retest
correlations and coefficients of variation)were estimated using aBayesian
approach. Specifically, we used Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling to
obtain posterior distributions, and we report their modes (which tend to
converge with the medians of the empirical distributions) as measures of
central tendency (denoted by “M”) and their 95% highest-density inter-
vals as confidence intervals (denoted by “HDI”). The tests were con-
ducted using broad default priors as implemented in the R package
BESTmcmc (83). In addition to its conceptual clarity, a Bayesian ap-
proach has several advantages over classic frequentist approaches (for ex-
ample, providing full distributions of means, SDs, group differences, and
effect sizes).Moreover, themethod renders transitive group comparisons
possible and handles outliers (83).
Latent variable modeling
To test the hypothesis of a general risk-preference factor,we implemented
a psychometric bifactor model, which has a long tradition in research
on intelligence (84) and has recently been rediscovered as an effective
method to model construct-relevant multidimensionality (27, 85, 86).
Multidimensionality is modeled such that a general factor expresses
itself directly across all manifest variables, and the remaining variance
is partitioned into a series of orthogonal factors. Specifically, we first
ran an EFA across all measures usingmaximum-likelihood estimation
and a bifactor rotation as implemented in the R package GPArotation
(87). One measure (GABS) had to be excluded before the latent var-
iable modeling, as it hindered model convergence because of its prob-
lematic distribution. The number of factors was informed by a preceding
parallel analysis on the heterogeneous correlation matrix (see above).
However, the suggested number of eight factors yielded trivial factors
(that is, factors on which only one measure loaded substantially) as well
as cross-loadings, and we therefore reduced the number of factors to
seven. Next, to determine the fit of the resulting factor structure, we im-
plemented a CFA, estimating the factor loadings of all measures on a
general risk-preference factor, as well as the factor loadings of measures
that loaded at least 0.25 on any of the factors in the preceding EFA (the
other loadings were fixed to 0). The model was estimated using the R
package lavaan (88) with the weighted least-squares mean and variance
estimator using diagonally weighted least squares and computing
robust SEs (this estimator takes both continuous and ordinal measures
into account). All factors were forced to be orthogonal, as defined by the
standard bifactor model.10 of 13
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nlFor the reduced model, we first ran an EFA without a general factor
and allowed for correlated factors, to maximize the chance that shared
variance between any of the measures could be extracted (that is, no
bifactor but a Promax rotation). On the basis of this EFA, we then ap-
plied a more stringent threshold of 0.5 (as opposed to 0.25 in the full
model) and implemented a CFA using the same method as described
for the fullmodel to assess themodel fit. The reducedmodel is shown in
fig. S3. Of the explained variance (53%), R still accounted for 50%, and
all the specific factors together accounted for the other 50%.
Bayesian regression analyses
With a set of sociodemographic, cognitive, and personality variables, we
performed Bayesian regression analyses on each of the risk-takingmea-
sures (table S5) and the psychometric factors extracted from them (table
S6). The regression analyses were based on the raw values of the mea-
sures (that is, not the residuals with control for age, sex, and study center,
as in the previous analyses). We used the R package rstanarm (89) for
running Bayesian regressions and implemented the mildly informative
default priors N(0,3) for the intercept as well as the predictors. Hence,
these regressions implement some regularization and minimize the
chance of obtaining spurious results. o
n
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Methods and DVs of behavioral tasks
fig. S1. Distributions of scores on risk-taking measures (n = 1507).
fig. S2. Network plot showing the disattenuated correlations between risk-taking measures
(only correlations exceeding an absolute value of 0.1; n = 1507).
fig. S3. Reduced bifactor model (n = 1507).
table S1. Sociodemographic and related variables.
table S2. Correlations between all risk-taking measures and extracted factors.
table S3. Disattenuated correlations between all risk-taking measures and extracted factors.
table S4. Factor loadings resulting from the EFA across all risk-taking measures.
table S5. Bayesian regression analyses: Individual measures as dependent variables.
table S6. Bayesian regression analyses: Psychometric factors as dependent variables.
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